Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization by Bannier, Christina E. & Hänsel, Dennis N.
  JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
Christina E. Bannier / Dennis N. Hänsel 
 
Determinants of banks' engagement in loan securitization 
 
 
No. 171 
October 2006  
 
 
 
 
CHRISTINA E. BANNIER
† AND DENNIS N. HÄNSEL
# 
 
 
 
DETERMINANTS OF BANKS' ENGAGEMENT IN LOAN SECURITIZATION* 
 
 
 
 
No. 171 
October 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1434-3401 
 
 
 
                                                 
*  We thank Ralf Elsas, Günther Franke, Christian Hirsch, Gang Huang, Jan-Pieter Krahnen, Thomas 
Weber and Christian Wilde for enlightening conversations and comments which greatly helped to 
improve the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support by Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Center for Financial Studies at Goethe-University Frankfurt. 
 
†  Christina E. Bannier, Goethe-University Frankfurt, Finance Department, Mertonstr. 17-21 (PF 88), 
60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, E-mail: bannier@finance.uni-frankfurt.de, Phone: +49 69 798 
23386, Fax: +49 69 798 28951. 
 
#  Dennis N. Hänsel, Goethe-University Frankfurt, Finance Department, Mertonstr. 17-21 (PF 88), 60325 
Frankfurt am Main, Germany, E-mail: haensel@finance.uni-frankfurt.de, Phone: +49 69 798 28429, 
Fax: +49 69 798 28951. 
 
Working Paper Series Finance and Accounting are intended to make research findings available to other researchers in 
preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Opinions are solely those of 
the authors 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides new insights into the nature of loan securitization. We analyze the use of 
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks from 1997 to 2004 and 
try to identify the influence that various firm-specific and macroeconomic factors may have 
on an institution's securitization decision. We find that not only regulatory capital arbitrage 
under Basel I has been driving the market. Rather, our results suggest that loan securitization 
is an appropriate funding tool for banks with high risk and low liquidity. It may also have 
been used by commercial banks to indirectly access investment-bank activities and the 
associated gains. 
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Even though credit risk transfer (CRT) activity has a long history,1 the ¯rst credit deriva-
tive transactions among a small number of banks did not occur before the early 1990s.
Since then, CRT activity has been growing at a rapid rate. From June 2001 to December
2005, the European market for credit risk grew from Euro 690 billion to Euro 5,792 billion
- an annual growth rate of 80 percent. Recent years have been characterized by signi¯cant
product innovation, an increasing number of market participants and growth in overall
transaction volume, while expectations of continued pro¯t opportunities for ¯nancial in-
termediaries prevail. Among the di®erent issuances by collateral type (residential and
commercial mortgage-backed securities, leases, credit card receivables, auto loans, among
others), the sector of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) with Euro 10.6 billion was the
second largest (16.2 percent) and growing at the fastest rate (up about 60 percent from
Euro 6.6 billion one year earlier). Within the CDO market, CLOs were the leading sector
with almost 40 percent of total issuance.2
Despite the dramatic growth in the market for credit risk, it is as to yet not entirely clear
why banks engage in the securitization of their loans. While securitization transactions
certainly increase liquidity, reduce credit or interest rate risk and may help to improve
leverage ratios and to allow recognition of accounting gains (Ambrose et al. 2003), many
¯nancial institutions still choose not to securitize any of their loans. On the other hand,
growth in CRT activity did not deteriorate despite the imminent introduction of the new
regulatory environment of Basel II that will no longer allow regulatory capital arbitrage,
which has been mentioned as the main argument for CRT in the early years.
In this paper, we try to ¯nd an answer to the question which factors drive a ¯nancial
institution's decision to securitize loans. In contrast to earlier papers analyzing the market
for CRT (Franke and Krahnen, 2005; Krahnen, 2005), we concentrate solely on the issuers'
characteristics. Yet, both analytical angles complement each other as far as the observed
performance of CRT markets is a result of issuers' intentions. With regard to market
characteristics, participants agree on two fundamental facts. First, the aggregate amount
of risk transfer that has occurred is small relative to the issuers' overall exposures and
also relative to the notional size of the market. Second, CRT activity is a key part of the
ongoing transformation of credit markets. Against this background, we try to characterize
the factors that drive banks' willingness to engage into the securitization of their loans.
Our research focus is similar to the one taken by Minton et al. (2004), who test
two hypotheses regarding the use of loan securitization: regulatory capital arbitrage and
e±cient ¯nancial contracting. Additionally to the question of whether or not banks decide
to engage in securitization at all, they also examine the size of transactions. However, their
work succumbs to one major drawback: in their sample on US private-sector ¯nancial
companies, the fraction of ¯nancial ¯rms securitizing assets is very small (rises from 2
percent in 1993 to less than 4 percent in 2002). Their results may therefore be strongly
driven by the characteristics of large banks which were the ¯rst to adopt securitization
activities. In our heterogeneous sample on European ¯nancial institutions, in contrast,
1Including transactions such as guarantees. Also, loan syndications have been common for many years,
see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005a).
2For more detailed information, see Thomson Financial Securities Data, Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) and The Bond Market Association.
1the proportion of securitizing ¯rms increases from 1.6 percent in 1997 to 27 percent in
2004. Yet, as we do not obtain information on regulatory capital for all banks, we cannot
focus as strongly on a test of the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis. We therefore put more
emphasis on a detailed test of the e±cient contracting explanation. In this respect, we
analyze di®erent ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic variables that may have an impact on
the e±ciency of the securitization instrument and therefore in°uence banks' engagement
in that market.
Summarizing our results, we ¯nd that while we cannot reject an in°uence of banks'
incentives to reduce regulatory capital, CRT activity seems to be strongly a®ected by ¯rm-
speci¯c characteristics. As might have been expected, the probability of a bank engaging
in loan securitization is found to increase in bank size, to decrease along with the bank's
liquidity and to increase along with the bank's credit risk. Since our results additionally
show that banks with high performance tend to securitize less than banks with low per-
formance, we may conclude that securitization activity should therefore not be taken as a
consequence of banks' \appetite for risk" (in order to increase performance) but rather as
a risk-transfer tool. Yet, risk-transfer seems to be limited since banks in the highest credit
risk decile are found to reduce their securitization activity along with higher credit risk.
Loan securitization may therefore also be used by commercial banks in order to indirectly
access investment-bank related activities and the associated gains. Additionally, we ¯nd
that for stock-listed banks in the highest risk decile, a lower equity ratio will lead to a
stronger inclination to securitize loans. Interestingly, the size of regulatory capital has
a signi¯cantly negative e®ect only for stock-listed banks. These ¯ndings underline that
banks primarily use CLOs to transfer and source risk in the market.3 The new regulatory
framework of Basel II should therefore not be expected to hamper the future growth of
CRT markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will lay out the main
hypotheses regarding variables that may in°uence banks' decision to securitize their loans.
Section 3 will delineate the bank sample data and the empirical methodology used to
test the variables' in°uence on banks' decisions. The subsequent section will describe
the variables and their general statistics. Section 5 presents the results of univariate and
multivariate tests that are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivation for securitization-transactions
The increasing use of credit securitization in the last few years opened up a new way for
¯nancial institutions to transfer risk and raise liquidity. The strong increase in the cumula-
tive volume of asset-backed securities (ABS) is often attributed to three motivating factors:
risk management, balance sheet restructuring and regulatory capital relief. Before we turn
to the di®erent arguments, a brief description of the ABS-market and the construction of
instruments is in order.
Generally, the CRT market consists of two major product categories: credit default
swaps (CDS) and CDOs. In a CDS, the investor buys the credit risk associated with
3The fact that not all ¯nancial institutions in our sample used a CLO for a true-sale but instead acted
simply as an intermediary buying and selling securitized portfolios even strengthens this interpretation.
2a speci¯c reference entity for a ¯xed time in exchange for a fee. The issuer in essence
obtains an insurance against loan default. CDSs are therefore mainly used for hedging
reasons. Within the class of CDOs, cash and synthetic CDOs may be distinguished. In
a cash CDO, the security is collateralized by bonds or loans, tranched into layers with
di®erent seniority and then sold to investors. In a synthetic CDO, in contrast, the bank
originating the loans does not actually transfer ownership of the loans; instead, the risk of
the portfolio is transmitted through credit derivatives to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)
or to investors. In both cases, the tranches display speci¯c risk-return characteristics and
obey the principle of strict subordination, i.e. the holders of the lowest tranche (equity
tranche or ¯rst loss piece, FLP4) absorb all losses up to the par value of this tranche.
If accumulated losses of the portfolio exceed this par value, the next senior tranche will
absorb the remaining losses and so forth. Payments therefore follow a waterfall structure
through the di®erent (equity, mezzanine and senior) tranches and the FLP bears most of
the risk contained in the underlying portfolio.
Generally, CDOs help investors to overcome the illiquidity of bonds and loans that stem
from market imperfections based on information asymmetries (DeMarzo, 2005). These are
a major obstacle to trading debt claims, in particular with regard to claims against small
and less well-known debtors (Franke and Krahnen, 2005). As market imperfections of this
type are similar to those in the insurance business, protection mechanisms are applied in
CDO transactions in the same vein. In particular the creation and retainment of FLP
by the issuer are an important tool to overcome problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard. By retaining the FLP, the tranche that is most susceptible to default due to moral
hazard, the default risk of the securitized portfolio remains largely on the balance sheet of
the issuing bank and so do monitoring incentives that reduce information asymmetries.5
At the same time, by selling mezzanine and senior tranches, the risk of unexpected losses
is transferred from the originator to investors and is hence much more strongly diversi¯ed
on the market (Krahnen, 2005; Krahnen and Wilde, 2005; BIS, 2005b). ABS-transactions
are therefore claimed to allow a more e±cient risk sharing between issuer and investors.6
The liquidity e®ect of securitization transactions is particularly obvious in cash transac-
tions. Here, the transfer of assets follows a true sale (\o®-balance sheet") of the underlying
portfolio to an SPV. The SPV then issues notes in order to fund the assets purchased from
the originating bank. Obviously, this transaction leads to an in°ow of cash and hence a
possible restructuring of the bank's balance sheet (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995), contin-
gent on the reallocation of cash by the originator. With respect to this latter argument it
is interesting to note that the funding costs involved with a securitization transaction are
mainly related to the credit quality of the underlying portfolio and not to the rating of
the originating bank (Krahnen, 2005). This also contributes to the marketability of these
instruments since investors do not have to invest in additional research on the issuer but
4The FLP is not equal to the ¯rst loss position if the originator implements credit enhancements in the
structure which are subordinated to the FLP. For a detailed description of di®erent credit enhancements
see Jobst (2002).
5With regard to a more detailed analysis of incentive e®ects based on securitized claims, see also Arrow
(1971), Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig (1985).
6This argument is related to the theoretical framework in DeMarzo (2005) where it is shown that the
contractual design of ABS-transactions can result in an e±cient risk sharing between investors, allowing
the direct funding of information sensitive assets via the capital markets.
3focus solely on the quality of underlying loans.7
Particularly in the early years of the CRT market, banks cited their interest in reducing
regulatory capital as the main motivation for issuing CLOs (Du±e and Garleanu, 2001).
International regulation in the Basel Capital Accord of 1992 uses the capital-asset ratio
to ensure that banks hold su±cient capital bu®er to bear default losses. In general, loan
pools require regulatory capital of 8 percent of the reference pool's assets. In order to
save on regulatory capital, banks may therefore try to securitize low-risk assets and retain
high-risk assets. If, for instance, only the highest-risk tranche (FLP) of a CDO is retained,
then the regulatory capital shrinks to the FLP's proportion of the total loan portfolio,
which will usually be much smaller than 8 percent. While this regulatory capital arbitrage
will no longer be possible under the new framework of Basel II, it may have contributed
to the increase in securitization in the early years (Minton et al. 2004).
Despite the tremendous recent growth in CRT markets, only few academic papers have
yet investigated in the implications of CDO transactions on the originating institution and
the ¯nancial sector in general. While earlier work on the question why banks choose to
securitize loans centered heavily on the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis (Calomiris
and Mason, 2004), more recent papers ¯nd that other arguments may also play an impor-
tant role. However, the multitude of di®erent in°uencing factors has not yet been analyzed
in a comprehensive empirical approach. In particular, the so-called e±cient contracting
hypothesis (Minton et al., 2004), viewing securitization mainly as a ¯nancial engineer-
ing innovation that allows intermediaries to access debt ¯nance without facing ¯nancial
distress, can hardly be disentangled in its e®ects from simple liquidity and balance-sheet
arguments.
In this paper, we therefore try to identify general factors, additional to the already
mentioned regulatory capital, risk management and balance-sheet arguments, that may
have an in°uence on banks' decision of whether or not to engage in loan securitization.
These additional arguments are based on very recent empirical research regarding the
e®ects of ABS transactions on CRT markets and the ¯nancial sector in general, in particular
with respect to wealth e®ects on the issuers and to the impact on systematic risk and
¯nancial stability.8
With regard to wealth e®ects, results are mixed. Ayotte and Gaon (2004) show that
the structural design of true sale ABS-transactions has a valuable e®ect for weak origina-
tors and thus weak banks have strong incentives towards activities in the securitization
market. Lockwood et al. (1996) ¯nd that wealth e®ects of securitization transactions are
signi¯cantly related to ¯nancial slack of the bank in the quarter preceding the securitiza-
tion announcement. In their study, ¯nancial slack is a proxy for the quality of the bank.
Findings are therefore quality speci¯c, with wealth increases for strong banks and wealth
losses for weak banks. The authors argue that a securitization transaction by a weak bank
results in a negative signal to the capital market in the sense of Myers and Majluf (1994),
while strong banks will only engage in the securitization market when they are able to ex-
tract a positive net present value from the transaction. Thus, strong banks have a higher
incentive to securitize, a result that is strengthened by the study of Thomas (2001), who,
7However, there remains some linkage to the originator's rating, if the SPV also enters into a servicer
agreement with the originating bank. In such cases, investors and rating agencies will have to evaluate the
servicer risk inherent in the transaction.
8For an overview of empirical results, see BIS (2005) and IMF (2006)
4Table 1: Sample summary statistics: bank origin
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Country
Belgium 14 12 8 8 8 8 8 8
Denmark 8 9 10 10 7 7 6 6
Germany 64 58 59 60 55 56 54 55
France 33 31 35 34 36 36 34 32
UK 33 35 36 36 35 35 33 33
Ireland 4 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Italy 31 28 27 27 28 23 23 22
Netherlands 11 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
Austria 4 5 5 6 4 6 6 6
Portugal 7 7 7 6 6 5 4 4
Sweden 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 7
Switzerland 10 8 8 8 8 9 10 9
Spain 18 17 15 14 14 14 14 14
other 13 13 13 14 15 14 13 10
N 257 247 250 250 244 241 233 226
in a cross-section regression of cumulative abnormal returns, reports that the ¯rst entry of
a successful originator in the securitization market is associated with signi¯cant gains.
HÄ ansel and Krahnen (2006) furthermore show that credit securitization tends to in-
crease the systematic risk of the issuing bank. In a cross-sectional analysis they reveal
that the issuer's beta rises signi¯cantly more if the bank is ¯nancially weak and is domi-
ciled in a bank-based ¯nancial system. Furthermore, the initial systematic risk of the
originator is found to have a signi¯cant impact on the change in systematic risk. Minton
et al. (2005) moreover prove that the likelihood of a ¯nancial institution being active in
CRT markets also depends on the type of the bank and the size of total assets.
Apart from aspects of credit risk, liquidity and equity capital, further motivation for
a bank's decision to be active in the market for loan securitization may therefore come
from the bank's performance (strong versus weak bank), its systematic risk, its size and
bank type. The following empirical study will scrutinize the impact that these variables
and more general macroeconomic factors may have on ¯nancial institutions' willingness to
engage in loan securitization.
5Table 2: Sample summary statistics: main bank business areas
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bank Type
Bank Holding 28 29 31 33 32 34 29 28
Commercial Bank 118 111 110 106 104 101 100 95
Cooperative Bank 21 20 21 24 24 22 23 21
Investment Bank 9 10 10 9 9 9 9 9
Medium / Long Term Credit Bank 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 5
Non-banking Credit Institution 8 7 9 9 10 10 10 10
Real Estate / Mortgage Bank 33 32 32 33 29 27 26 26
Savings Bank 17 16 15 14 13 14 16 16
Governmental Credit Institution 16 16 16 16 16 18 15 16
N 257 247 250 250 244 241 233 226
3 Methodology and sample data
3.1 Sample
Our sample comprises all European banks in Bankscope for the period from 1997 to 2004
that satisfy two criteria. First, total bank assets must exceed 150 million Euro and second,
the number of loans on each bank's balance sheet must be larger than 800 million. We
hence concentrate only on relatively large banks, drop all central banks and thus arrive at
a ¯nal sample of 316 banks that comply with both criteria for at least one year.
Table 1 reports the number of banks for each year in our sample and their country-
speci¯c a±liation. The ¯nal sample consists of 1948 bank entries with an average of 243
banks per year, ranging from a minimum of 226 banks in 2004 to a maximum of 257 in
1997. Due to massive concentration processes in the banking sector, our sample parallels
the generally-observed decrease in the number of banks per year. Overall, our sample
comprises banks from 17 di®erent countries. The main part of our sample (about 60%) is
made up of ¯nancial institutions from Germany, France, UK and Italy.
Table 2 reports the classi¯cation of banks with regard to di®erent business areas (taken
from the Bankscope database). Commercial banks consistently make up slightly over 40
percent of the ¯nal sample and as such account for the largest fraction. Real estate banks,
bank holdings and cooperative banks together roughly account for another 40 percent of the
sample. Note that while the number of commercial banks in our sample has been slightly
decreasing over the years (from 118 in 1997 to 95 in 2004), the number of real estate banks,
bank holdings and cooperative banks has remained constant or even slightly increasing
until 2000 and decreasing only afterwards. The number of other ¯nancing institutions has
remained relatively stable in our sample. Investment banks make up only a very small
fraction of less than 4 percent.
63.2 Measures of securitization
Data for individual issuances of securitization transactions stem from three di®erent sources.
First, we use the European Securitization Almanac (January, July, October 2004 and
February 2005) by Deutsche Bank, second, we control each originator's securitization ac-
tivities with the Quarterly CDO Deal List (September 2005) by Standard and Poor's and,
¯nally, the European Securitization Deal List (March 2006) by Computershare Fixed In-
come Services Limited. All banks without issuance activities in the securitization market
are cross-checked with Lexis/Nexis Database.
Table 3 reports the percentage of ¯rms that securitized assets for any given year in
our sample period. Panel A sorts the results by year and country of the originating bank,
while panel B sorts the results by the originator's type (business area). Panel C ¯nally
accounts only for listed banks, as a subsample of the total data set. The fraction of
¯nancial institutions securitizing assets increases from 1.6 percent in 1997 to 27 percent
in 2004. The largest fraction of securitization transactions is undertaken by banks with
headquarters in Germany and the UK. In recent years, also banks in Spain have been active
in securitization processes. As can be seen from panel B, most transactions are initiated
by commercial banks, to a much lesser extent also by mortgage banks, savings banks and
investment banks. Table 3 also shows that the percentage of stock-quoted ¯nancial ¯rms
securitizing assets has increased. Yet, while in the ¯rst years of our sample (1997-2001),
stock-listed institutions accounted for more than 50% of all CLO issuances, recent years
have seen a signi¯cant decrease of this proportion to less than 40%. At the same time, the
proportion of stock-listed banks in the full sample has increased from 26% to 36%.
3.3 Methodology
Our empirical approach analyzes how ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic variables in°uence
securitization behavior in a Probit framework. With simultaneous consideration of the
di®erent data sources we check for each year whether or not a bank in our data set secu-
ritized assets. Whenever there is at least one securitization transaction by the bank, the
dependent variable in our regression takes on the value 1, otherwise, i.e. if there is no
securitization activity, it takes on the value 0.
Within a limited dependent variable model,9 we adopt a speci¯cation that is designed
to handle the speci¯c requirements of binary dependent variables, where the probability of
observing a value of one is given by
Pr(yi = 1 j xi;¯) = 1 ¡ F(¡x0
i¯): (1)
Here, F is a continuous, strictly increasing function that takes on real values and returns
a value ranging form zero to one. By choosing a probit function for F, it follows that
Pr(yi = 0 j xi;¯) = F(¡x0
i¯): (2)
9A broader discussion of the general approach may be found in Greene (1997) or Johnston and DiNardo
(1997).
7Table 3: Summary of securitization activities by ¯nancial entities
Frequency of ABS issuance by sample banks; Overall indicates number of banks, N number
of banks which issue an ABS-transaction.
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Panel A: ABS Issuance by year and country
Overall 257 247 250 250 244 241 233 226
N 4 7 22 43 45 59 59 61
Percentage of sample 1.6 2.8 8.8 17.2 18.4 24.5 25.3 27
Belgium 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 2
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Germany 0 1 5 10 11 15 12 14
France 0 0 2 4 3 6 6 8
Great Britain 0 2 5 10 6 10 12 12
Ireland 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0
Italy 0 0 2 4 10 6 5 3
Netherlands 2 1 2 4 3 4 5 5
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Portugal 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 0 0 1 3 3 2 3 3
Spain 0 1 4 4 5 9 11 9
Other countries 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Panel B: Breakdown of issuance by type of ¯rm
Bank Holding 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2
Commercial Bank 3 6 13 31 29 38 38 37
Cooperative Bank 1 0 0 1 5 2 3 3
Investment Bank 0 0 1 2 1 3 4 5
Medium / Long Term Credit Bank 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
Non-banking Credit Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Real Estate / Mortgage Bank 0 1 3 6 4 8 5 6
Savings Bank 0 0 3 1 2 4 6 4
Governmental Credit Inst. 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2
Panel C: Quoted banks
Quoted on the stock exchange 67 71 74 80 81 83 84 82
Percentage of sample 26.1 28.7 29.6 32 33.2 34.4 36.1 36.3
Number of issuances by quoted banks 2 5 13 22 25 25 24 24
Percentage of sub-sample 3 7 17.6 27.2 30.5 30.1 28.6 29.3
Percentage of all issuing banks 50 71.4 59.1 51.2 55.6 42.4 40.7 39.3
8Given such a speci¯cation, we can estimate the model parameters by using the method
of maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is given by
l(¯) =
X
yilog(1 ¡ F(¡x0
i¯)) + (1 ¡ yi)log(F(¡x0
i¯)): (3)
The ¯rst-order conditions for this likelihood are nonlinear, so that obtaining parameter
estimates requires an iterative solution. By default, our statistical program uses a second
derivative method for iteration and computation of the covariance matrix for parameter
estimates. Interpretation of the coe±cient values is further complicated by the fact that
estimated coe±cients from a binary model cannot be interpreted as the marginal e®ect of
the independent on the dependent variable. The interpretation of results may therefore
only be based on the signs of signi¯cant coe±cients.
4 De¯nitions of variables and descriptive statistics
4.1 Hypotheses and de¯nitions of variables
Generally, we test whether di®erent ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic variables have an
in°uence on the probability of a CLO-transaction by banks:
dependent variable = f(originator-speci¯c variables, macroeconomic variables)
Among the ¯rm-speci¯c variables, di®erent factors are included, based on the arguments
presented in section 2. As the main variables we consider the originator's credit risk,
leverage, performance and liquidity. In the following, we will describe each variable and
its expected in°uence on the regressand in turn. A de¯nition of variables and a summary
of expected regressor signs is given in table 4.
The variable risk in our data set is supposed to re°ect the originator's credit risk
situation by measuring the bank's credit risk provision relative to net interest income.
Since loan securitization allows a risk transfer of (a fraction of) the underlying portfolio to
the capital market, we should assume that ¯rms with higher asset risk will have a higher
incentive to securitize in order to reduce expected ¯nancial distress costs. Because e®ects
should be strongest for ¯rms with highest risk, we also introduce a dummy variable (high
risk) that is equal to one for the ten percent of banks with highest risk and zero otherwise.10
Additionally, we test whether the risk variable has an in°uence on this subgroup (via the
additional regressor high risk * risk). For the subgroup of stock-listed banks we account
for an additional dummy high risk * low equity that accounts for the ten percent of ¯rms
with both highest risk and lowest equity.
Yet, with regard to credit risk, a second e®ect may be conceivable. As an alternative
to transferring risk, a bank may also try to increase (ex-ante) risk-taking in order to raise
expected returns and therefore choose to securitize loans. This hypothesis may be denoted
10The empirical models account for two di®erent ways to calculate this dummy: in models I-V(a) the
percentile is calculated with respect to the full data set, in models I-V(b) it is calculated for every year.
The same holds for the additional dummies referring to tier 1 capital, liquidity and performance.
9as banks' \appetite for risk" and refers to an ex-ante notion of risk, which will be measured
by the quality of risk, a regressor that describes the ratio of the ¯rm's gross interest income
to total assets. According to the above reasoning, the quality variable should be expected
to have a positive e®ect on a bank's propensity to engage in securitization activities. On
the other hand, the quality variable can be negative if it is a proxy for weak banks which
have greater incentives to be active in the securitization market.
With respect to the regulatory capital relief hypothesis we include two proxies for the
equity situation of the bank. Tier 1, describing the ratio of tier 1 capital relative to risk
weighted assets, and equity share are both expected to exhibit a negative in°uence on a
bank's propensity to issue CLOs, because the regulatory capital relief hypothesis suggests
that banks with lower capital ratios should be more likely to securitize assets. Again, this
e®ect should be strongest for banks with the lowest capital ratios. In order to take account
of this, we generate a dummy variable (low tier 1) that is equal to one for the ten percent
of banks with the lowest capital ratios and zero otherwise. We expect a positive sign for
this dummy variable. To be consistent, we also test whether tier 1 capital has an e®ect
among the subgroup of banks with lowest capital ratios via regressor low tier 1 * tier 1.
For stock-listed banks, we also examine whether there is a signi¯cant e®ect in the group
of banks with highest credit risk and lowest equity (regressor high risk * low tier 1). A
positive sign of this regressor should indicate that in particular banks with problems in
ful¯lling the regulatory constraints choose to securitize their loans.
In line with earlier work on the wealth e®ects of securitization transactions, we take
into account a di®erential impact of weak versus strong banks. In this respect, we use two
variables as proxies for the quality (respectively performance) of a bank: return on equity
(RoE) and cost-income ratio (CIR). In the overall sample, both a positive or a negative
coe±cient may be conceivable due to earlier research results, while a negative sign seems
reasonable for the banks with the lowest quality, measured by the decile with the highest
value of the CIR variable (regressors low performance for the dummy variable and low
performance * CIR for the e®ect of performance on the subgroup).11
Furthermore we include a proxy for the liquidity of the originator. As has been ex-
plained in section 2, securitization activities allow banks to separate credit origination
from credit funding. As several empirical studies implied, securitization tends to be used
mainly as a funding tool, such that the incentive to engage in securitization should be
higher for banks with a shortfall in liquidity. We therefore expect a negative sign for the
overall liquidity coe±cient and a positive sign for the decile of banks with lowest liquidity
(regressor low liquidity for the dummy variable and low liquidity * liquidity for the e®ect
of liquidity on the subgroup).
Finally, we include some general characteristics of the originating ¯rm as additional
regressors. First, we analyze the impact of ¯rm size by taking account of total assets. This
regressor is expected to display a positive sign, as has also been shown by Minton et al.
(2004). As a second proxy for the size of the bank we include the number of assigned loans.
The tax variable captures a combination of size and ¯rm quality and therefore should be
assigned a positive coe±cient. In essence, it comprises the taxes paid relative to earnings
before taxes. A high value of the business variable indicates that the bank generates
11For stock-listed banks we also include a test for the best-performing banks measured as those in the
decile with lowest CIR values with regressors high performance and high performance * CIR.
10more pro¯t from investment banking activities, while a low value should be observed for
commercial banks. Several studies show that investment banks are more likely to engage
in securitization so that we expect a positive sign for this regressor. Still, the results with
respect to this ¯nal variable may be strongly dependent on regulatory mechanisms and
may therefore be weaker for European data.
Table 11 in the appendix reports the di®erent macroeconomic variables that are used
as regressors. We use the following main variables for the whole sample: credit default
probability, ratio of rating downgrades to upgrades, growth rate of GDP, short- and long-
term interest rates and yield on a well-diversi¯ed stock index (CDAX for Germany, CAC40
for France, FTSE 350 for UK). Among the dummy variables, we consider year-dummies,
country-dummies and industry-dummies for the banks. In the sample restricted on stock-
listed banks, we additionally take into account the volatility of stock returns, the market-
to-book ratio (MBR) and the ¯rm's beta.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 12 in the appendix presents the general statistics with regard to the di®erent ¯rm-
speci¯c as well as macroeconomic regressors. From the data, it can be seen that banks in
our sample are very heterogeneous, in particular with respect to their risk characteristics,
but also regarding their performance and equity capital holdings.12 In particular the large
range of tier 1 capital that banks hold is indicative of vastly di®erent business strategies,
also stemming - of course - from the di®erent types of banks we are considering. Also banks'
switch from holding capital appropriate for Basel I to the new regulatory requests in Basel
II, that should coincide with our sample period, may have led to relatively heterogeneous
observations with regard to tier 1 capital. As we cannot infer the exact switching time
from our data, we may only hypothesize that large banks tended to change their regulatory
capital holdings relatively early compared to smaller banks. Data with respect to the size
of total assets and assigned loans also mirror the large disparity of the total sample. The
same is true for the additional data on stock-listed banks as can be seen from the large
ranges of volatility, market-to-book ratio and market beta values.
The statistics of macroeconomic regressors parallel the movement through the economic
cycle. This is particularly obvious from the large range of values for GDP-growth rates,
interest rates and the country-speci¯c stock market index. A breakdown of the index' and
interest rate's development in di®erent countries can be found in table 14 in the appendix.
We may therefore conclude that our sample contains very heterogeneous ¯nancial in-
stitutions that focus on di®erent business models and are observed in di®erent phases of
performance and economic (country-speci¯c) business-cycles.
12Further information can be obtained from table 13 in the appendix where descriptive statistics are
given for three subgroups of banks: those with highest risk, with highest performance and lowest equity.
11Table 4: De¯nition of ¯rm characteristics
De¯nition of ¯rm characteristics to be included as regressors in the probit regression on the
probability to securitize assets. Dummy variables are calculated in two ways: in models
I-V(a) the calculation of the percentile is based on the entire data set, in models I-V(b)
the calculation has been carried out for each year. Both refers to di®erent signs for strong
and weak banks with respect to performance. Ambiguous re°ects di®erent predictions from
theoretical work. Variable generation is based on Bankscope and Datastream database.
Regressor De¯nition Expected Sign
Asset characteristics
Risk Credit risk provision / (+)
Net interest income
High risk (dummy) Percentile of banks with highest risk (+)
High risk * risk High risk (dummy) multiply (-)
with Risk variable
High risk * low tier 1 High risk (dummy) multiply (-)
with low tier (dummy)
(dummy, stock-listed ¯rms only)
Quality Gross interest income / (both)
Total assets
Equity characteristics
Tier 1 Tier 1 capital / (-)
risk weighted assets
Low tier 1 (dummy) Percentile of banks with (+)
lowest tier 1 capital
Low tier 1 * tier 1 Low tier 1 (dummy) multiply (-)
with Tier 1 variable
Equity share Equity / total assets (-)
Performance characteristics
RoA Return on average assets (both)
RoE Return on average equity (both)
CIR Cost income ratio (both)
Low performance (dummy) Percentile of banks with highest CIR (+)
Low performance * CIR Low performance (dummy) multiply (-)
with CIR variable
Liquidity characteristics
Liquidity Money lent to other banks / (-)
Money borrowed from other banks
Low liquidity (dummy) Percentile of banks with lowest liquidity (+)
Low liquidity * liquidity Low liquidity (dummy) (-)
multiply with Liquidity variable
General characteristics
Total assets Total assets (+)
Loans Assigned loans (+)
Tax Taxes / earnings before taxes (+)
Business Net fees & commissions / (ambiguous)
Net interest revenue
125 Results
5.1 Univariate Results
As a ¯rst step in our analysis, we group the banks into those that did not securitize loans
and those who did issue CLOs and examine the di®erences in characteristics between the
two groups. Results concerning univariate tests of di®erences with respect to the selected
characteristics are given in table 5. It displays the number of observations in each group,
the mean and standard deviation of the coe±cient. As can already be seen, the smallest
number of observations is obtained with regard to the test of tier 1 capital. The last column
in table 5 provides the p-values of a test on the equality of the two subsamples' means.
Signi¯cant results are derived both with regard to ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic
variables. Among the ¯rm-speci¯c regressors it is only the equity share and the return on
equity that do not lead to signi¯cant di®erences between the two subsamples. Among the
macroeconomic variables we ¯nd that only the country speci¯c index yield does not play
a signi¯cant role.
Summarizing the univariate results we ¯nd that ¯nancial institutions deciding on secu-
ritizing loans seem to be lowly-performing, large ¯rms with low capital ratios, high risk of
lower quality and low liquidity. Additionally, they display a large number of assigned loans
and seem to be engaged more strongly in investment business. With regard to macroe-
conomic variables, we ¯nd that banks engaging in loan securitization seem to succumb
to a higher probability of credit default and credit rating downgrades (with low yields on
credit risk and a high spread) and work in an environment with low GDP growth rates
and interest rates.
As table 6 shows, the ratio of ¯rms using securitization versus those that did not is
increasing over the years. Various dummy variables also account for signi¯cant di®erences
between securitizing and non-securitizing ¯nancial institutions. Particularly in France,
the UK and Spain there are signi¯cant di®erences between the sub-groups. Also, we ¯nd
that commercial banks are much more likely to choose securitization while real estate
banks are less likely to do so. Combined with the fact that securitizing banks derive
signi¯cantly more pro¯ts from investment banking business, this points to an interesting
¯rst conclusion: by issuing CLOs, commercial banks possibly try to (indirectly) increase
their stake in investment banking by using new instruments (of securitization) in their
traditional business ¯eld of bank lending.
Tables 7 and 8 deliver the results of the same univariate analysis on stock-listed ¯rms
only. While the results are similar with regard to macroeconomic variables, ¯rm-speci¯c
regressors lead to slightly di®erent conclusions. For stock-listed ¯nancial institutions we
hence ¯nd that banks using securitization have a higher market-to-book ratio and beta than
non-issuing ¯rms, a lower capital ratio, a higher cost-income-ratio, much lower liquidity and
only slightly higher total assets than ¯rms that are not using CLOs. Overall, among stock-
listed ¯rms, the di®erences between securitizing and non-securitizing ¯nancial institutions
are much smaller than in the total sample. In particular, risk characteristics do not seem
to drive the di®erence between the two groups of banks. Interestingly, the volatility of
stock-listed banks does not account for a signi¯cant di®erence. In this respect, our results
di®er from Minton et al. (2004), who ¯nd that issuing ¯rms have a signi¯cantly lower stock
13Table 5: Univariate tests of di®erences in ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic characteristics
- all banks
p-values for the tests on the equality of means are reported in the last column. These test
assume unequal means of the two groups if the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected at
the 10 signi¯cance level. *, **, ***: signi¯cance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
securitization no securitization
regressor N mean std. dev. N mean std. dev. p-value
Risk 278 21.37 25.75 1362 17.55 34.80 0.083*
Quality 290 9.86 6.03 1395 11.11 8.24 0.015**
Tier 1 220 7.80 2.24 825 9.51 8.33 0.003***
Equity share 296 4.62 2.20 1426 5.16 7.11 0.196
RoE 296 9.94 11.40 1420 10.62 10.92 0.334
CIR 290 63.98 15.86 1408 58.99 22.35 0.000***
Liquidity 278 86.06 92.47 1343 115.85 124.29 0.000***
Total assets 296 198077 208904 1426 95906 125239 0.000***
Loans 296 91554 91422 1424 46194 56041 0.000***
Tax 288 26.82 16.41 1364 30.23 16.34 0.001***
Business 286 49.99 85.66 1400 36.83 49.79 0.000***
CDP 296 2.51 0.87 1426 2.06 1.00 0.000***
DUR 296 2.40 0.99 1426 2.06 1.00 0.000***
GDP Rate 296 2.26 1.65 1426 2.50 1.68 0.028**
Index 294 220.40 60.15 1327 219.30 71.88 0.807
Short interest 296 3.71 1.18 1426 4.01 1.47 0.001***
Long interest 294 4.78 0.60 1381 5.05 0.78 0.000***
Credit risk spread 296 1.60 0.41 1426 1.31 0.58 0.000***
Performance AAA 296 0.05 0.12 1426 0.09 0.12 0.000***
Performance BBB 296 0.07 0.12 1426 0.09 0.12 0.001***
14Table 6: Univariate tests of di®erences in dummy variables - all banks
Overall, 1722 observations are included, with 296 securitizations and 1426 no-securitizations.
N denotes the number of entries in the respective category, e.g. 257 bank entries in year 1997
of which 7 belonged to banks securitizing loans (Nsec) and 250 to banks not issuing CLOs,
Nnosec. p-values refer to the respective Â
2-Test. *, **, ***: signi¯cance at the 10%-, 5%- and
1%-level, respectively.
overall securitization no securitization Â
2-Test
regressor N Nsec (in %) Nnosec (in %) Pearson p-value
Â
2
Year 1997 257 7 0.02 250 0.18 44,41 0,000***
Year 1998 247 22 0.07 225 0.16 13,90 0,000***
Year 1999 250 43 0.15 207 0.15 2,35E-05 0,996
Year 2000 250 45 0.15 205 0.14 0,14 0,713
Year 2001 244 59 0.2 185 0.13 9,76 0,002***
Year 2002 241 59 0.2 182 0.13 10,47 0,001***
Year 2003 233 61 0.21 172 0.12 15,30 0,000***
Germany 406 68 0.23 338 0.24 0,07 0,788
France 239 29 0.1 210 0.15 4,98 0,026**
UK 243 57 0.19 186 0.13 7,81 0,005***
Spain 106 43 0.15 63 0.04 43,36 0,000***
Italy 187 29 0.1 158 0.11 0,42 0,519
Other country 541 70 0.24 471 0.33 10,01 0,002***
Commercial 750 193 0.65 557 0.39 68,14 0,000***
Cooperative 212 33 0.11 179 0.13 0,45 0,504
Real 155 14 0.05 141 0.1 7,96 0,005***
Investment 106 20 0.07 86 0.06 0,22 0,636
Savings 65 16 0.05 49 0.03 2,62 0,106
Other type 434 20 0.07 414 0.29 64,52 0,000***
15Table 7: Univariate tests of di®erences in ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic characteristics
- stock-listed banks only
p-values for the tests on the equality of means are reported in the last column. These test
assume unequal means of the two groups if the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected at
the 10 signi¯cance level.*, **, ***: signi¯cance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
securitization no securitization
regressor N mean std. dev. N mean std. dev. p-value
Risk 138 22,02 14,00 402 21,23 33,95 0,791
Quality 138 9,72 3,03 404 9,40 5,41 0,499
Tier 1 117 7,32 1,59 281 7,95 2,42 0,010***
Equity share 138 4,66 1,69 404 5,16 2,50 0,030**
RoE 138 11,14 8,52 404 11,18 12,43 0,970
CIR 138 64,37 16,12 401 60,95 14,37 0,020**
Liquidity 138 76,23 54,63 399 110,89 107,4 0,000***
Total assets 138 11,81 1,25 404 11,26 1,14 0,000***
Loans 138 11,17 1,10 404 10,64 1,08 0,000***
Tax 138 26,73 16,41 401 29,48 14,41 0,062*
Business 138 56,98 41,96 401 45,21 29,36 0,000***
CDP 138 2,44 0,88 404 2,13 1,01 0,001***
DUR 138 2,30 0,99 404 2,13 1,02 0,078*
GDP Rate 138 2,48 1,87 404 2,67 1,99 0,319
Index 138 231,24 56,88 366 215,40 73,74 0,023**
Short interest 138 3,71 1,15 404 4,22 1,84 0,003***
Long interest 138 4,83 0,61 392 5,13 0,90 0,000***
Credit risk spread 138 1,54 0,43 404 1,36 0,58 0,001***
Performance AAA 138 6,31 12,19 404 7,74 12,25 0,236
Performance BBB 138 7,88 12,38 404 8,30 12,09 0,724
Volatility 138 12,41 7,59 404 12,50 9,39 0,914
MBR 135 2,57 1,58 386 2,27 1,72 0,070*
Beta 133 0.67 0.21 392 0.57 0.28 0.000***
return volatility.
5.2 Multivariate Results
Table 9 presents the results of a multivariate probit regression on the likelihood of issuing
securitized assets via a CLO by all sample banks as delineated in section 3.3. Three di®erent
models are tested. Models I und II include only ¯rm-speci¯c regressors and year-, country-
and business-dummy variables. As information about tier 1 capital is only obtainable for a
subgroup of ¯rms in our sample, it is included only in model I, so that model II - otherwise
identical to model I - allows for a larger sample size.
Models Ia,b and IIa,b include the above-mentioned additional ¯rm-speci¯c dummy
variables, where a 1 is assigned to those ¯rms in the extreme decile of the sample with
regard to the respective ¯rm-speci¯c variable (e.g. the 10 percent of ¯rms with the lowest
tier 1 capital in the entire data set) and a 0 otherwise. Generally, the decile is calculated
with respect to the total data set in all models denoted by \a", while the decile is calculated
per year in all models denoted by \b". Model III allows for macroeconomic variables as
16Table 8: Univariate tests of di®erences in dummy variables - stock-listed banks only
Overall, 542 observations are included, with 138 securitizations and 404 no-securitizations. N
denotes the number of entries in the respective category, e.g. 67 bank entries in year 1997
of which 5 belonged to banks securitizing loans (Nsec) and 62 to banks not issuing CLOs,
Nnosec. p-values refer to the respective Â
2-Test. *, **, ***: signi¯cance at the 10%-, 5%- and
1%-level, respectively.
overall securitization no securitization Â
2-Test
regressor N Nsec (in %) Nnosec (in %) Pearson p-value
Â
2
LIST 542 138 0.47 404 0.28 38,02 0,000***
Year 1997 67 5 0.04 62 0.15 13,05 0,000***
Year 1998 71 13 0.09 58 0.14 2,20 0,138
Year 1999 74 22 0.16 52 0.13 0,82 0,364
Year 2000 81 25 0.18 56 0.14 1,46 0,226
Year 2001 82 25 0.18 57 0.14 1,29 0,257
Year 2002 83 24 0.17 59 0.15 0,62 0,432
Year 2003 84 24 0.17 60 0.15 0,51 0,477
Germany 98 35 0.25 63 0.16 6,63 0,010***
France 46 14 0.1 32 0.08 0,66 0,418
UK 77 17 0.12 60 0.15 0,54 0,462
Spain 93 21 0.15 72 0.18 0,49 0,484
Italy 38 23 0.17 15 0.04 26,48 0,000***
Other country 190 28 0.2 162 0.4 17,73 0,000***
Commercial 295 114 0.83 181 0.45 59,28 0,000***
Cooperative 43 12 0.09 31 0.08 0,15 0,701
Real 40 6 0.04 34 0.08 2,49 0,115
Investment 7 2 0.01 5 0.01 no test possible
Savings 13 0 0 13 0.03 no test possible
Other type 144 4 0.03 140 0.35 53,17 0,000***
17additional regressors.
Among the ¯rm-speci¯c variables, the magnitude of total assets has a signi¯cantly
positive in°uence on the likelihood of securitization. In all models, a bank is more likely
to engage in securitization, the \larger" the bank is with regard to total assets held. Also
the riskiness of loans increases the likelihood of securitization (in all models but model
III). A positive e®ect is also found for the quality of credit risk. A bank's liquidity, in
contrast, reduces the probability of a CLO. An increasing e®ect is ¯nally also found for the
cost-income-ratio. The equity share exerts a signi¯cantly positive e®ect only in the ¯rst
model. Interestingly, tier 1 capital does not have a signi¯cant impact on a bank's decision
to issue CLOs.
From models Ia,b and IIa,b we can additionally infer that banks in the decile of highest
risk have a signi¯cantly positive propensity to engage in loan securitization. Still, for those
banks the probability of issuing a CLO decreases along with more credit risk as can be
seen from the signi¯cantly negative sign of the high risk * risk coe±cient. Further extreme
cases such as the decile of ¯rms with lowest performance or lowest liquidity do not seem
to a®ect a bank's securitization decision signi¯cantly.
With regard to the dummy variables, we ¯nd signi¯cantly positive e®ects for all year
dummies because of the increase in overall securitization activity. The country dummies
for Germany, Italy and the UK are mainly signi¯cantly positive, for France the dummy is
always negative. With respect to the bank's type we obtain highly signi¯cant and positive
e®ects for almost all business types except for investment banks. Banks' securitization
decisions moreover seem to be positively in°uenced by the robustness of the surrounding
economy as mirrored by GDP-growth rates and the development of stock-indices. Also
the credit risk spread displays a signi¯cantly positive impact. Inclusion of macroeconomic
variables does not, however, seem to increase the explanatory power of the regression over
the basic model I with ¯rm-speci¯c and dummy variables only.
Results from the regression on stock-listed ¯nancial institutions are given in table 10.
Again, the magnitude of total assets delivers signi¯cantly positive coe±cients. Similarly
to the results on all banks, risk has a signi¯cantly positive e®ect on the likelihood of
issuing CLOs, while liquidity displays a negative albeit not always signi¯cant impact. The
cost-income-ratio, in contrast, does no longer have an unambiguous, signi¯cant in°uence
on the probability of securitization. In contrast to the test on all banks, for stock-listed
institutions we ¯nd a negative impact of tier 1 capital that is signi¯cant in three out of four
models. While volatility and beta do not show any signi¯cant e®ects, the market-to-book
ratio seems to in°uence a bank's securitization signi¯cantly positive.
As models IVa and IVb show, banks in the decile with lowest tier 1 capital have a
lower propensity to engage in securitization transactions. This contrasts with the usual
intuition of securitization transactions being used in order to save on regulatory capital.
The signi¯cance of this dummy variable changes, however, if the decile with lowest tier 1
capital is calculated per year. This is due to the fact that securitization activity in our
sample increased over the years while tier 1 capital gradually decreased. Results with
regard to this dummy variable are therefore not easy to interpret. Additionally, we ¯nd
that the probability of issuing CLOs in this subgroup increases along with tier 1 capital.
This ¯nding may imply that loan securitization may help banks to ful¯ll their regulatory
requirements but that the possibility to use this instrument is limited such that it may not
18Table 9: Multivariate results on the likelihood of CLO-transactions - all banks
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of issuing assets via an ABS-transaction. The
dependent variable equals one if a bank accomplishes an ABS-transaction and zero otherwise.
Coef. is the coe±cient estimate. p-values are estimated with the corresponding z-statistic.
Log likelihood is the maximized value of the log likelihood function l(^ ¯). McFadden R
2 is an
analog to the R
2 reported in linear regression models. *, **, ***: signi¯cance at the 10%-,
5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
I Ia Ib II IIa IIb III
regressor Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Constant -7.665*** -8.133*** -8.220*** -8.222*** -8.101*** -8.163*** -6.690***
Risk 0.007*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.004* 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.003
Quality 0.018* 0.020* 0.018* 0.061* 0.045 0.044 0.067**
Tier 1 -0.025 0.012 0.019
Equity Share 0.068* 0.033 0.032 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004
RoE 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.006
CIR 0.009* 0.013** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.009**
Liquidity -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
LN (Total Assets) 0.307*** 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.351*** 0.313*** 0.317*** 0.349***
TAX -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000
Business -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year 1998 0.913*** 0.890*** 0.926*** 0.730*** 0.730*** 0.754***
Year 1999 1.476*** 1.560*** 1.535*** 1.242*** 1.248*** 1.273***
Year 2000 1.329*** 1.434*** 1.418*** 1.240*** 1.287*** 1.303***
Year 2001 1.592*** 1.662*** 1.623*** 1.420*** 1.432*** 1.448***
Year 2002 1.591*** 1.643*** 1.568*** 1.403*** 1.395*** 1.387***
Year 2003 1.711*** 1.759*** 1.668*** 1.504*** 1.496*** 1.495***
Germany 0.570*** 0.081 0.078 0.349** 0.193 0.216 0.014
France -0.378* -0.632*** -0.590*** -0.291* -0.327** -0.304* 0.001
UK 0.580*** 0.569*** 0.549*** 0.273* 0.325** 0.319** -0.237**
Spain -0.015 -0.346 -0.367* 0.124 -0.038 -0.017 0.568***
Italy 0.915*** 0.949*** 0.918*** 1.113*** 1.094*** 1.090*** 0.205
Commercial 1.477*** 1.443*** 1.422*** 1.331*** 1.318*** 1.313*** -0.407**
Cooperative 1.481*** 1.641*** 1.590*** 1.342*** 1.481*** 1.481*** 0.296*
Real 1.063*** 1.130*** 1.093*** 0.577*** 0.515** 0.517** 0.110
Investment 0.601 0.372 0.422 0.655* 0.597 0.599 0.878***
Savings 1.171*** 1.141*** 1.110*** 0.841*** 0.802*** 0.776*** 1.289***
GDP rate 1.382***
Index 0.544**
Long interest 0.501
Credit risk spread 0.881***
low tier 1 -2.041 -0.419
low tier 1*tier 1 0.482 0.166
high risk 1.371*** 1.161*** 0.738*** 0.493**
high risk*risk -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.020***
low performance 2.093 -0.134 2.201* 1.503
low performance*cir -0.024 -0.003 -0.027* -0.020
low liquidity 0.216 0.339 -0.289 -0.227
low liquidity*liquidity 0.005 0.002 0.029 0.031*
Log likelihood -379.40 -365.29 -365.23 -528.45 -519.31 -518.18 -518.44
Obs with Dep=0 739 739 739 1257 1257 1257 1160
Obs with Dep=1 213 213 213 268 268 268 266
Total obs 952 952 952 1525 1525 1525 1426
McFadden R2 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.25
19be used as a last resort. Similarly to the results on the total bank sample, we ¯nd that
banks in the decile with highest risk have a high propensity to engage in loan securitization
but that the probability of issuing CLOs in this subgroup decreases along with credit risk.
Again, this may point to a certain limit to use this instrument as a risk-transfer tool. Model
IVc ¯nally shows that banks with high risk and low equity have a high propensity to issue
CLOs as given by the positive coe±cient of the high risk * low equity regressor. Inclusion
of this latter variable also strongly increases the explanatory power of the regression as can
be seen from the rise in R2 from 0:41 in model IVa to 0:44 in model IVc.
With regard to dummy variables, we ¯nd slightly less signi¯cant and also more ambigu-
ous e®ects as compared to the full sample. In particular, the country dummies display less
constant impacts: only for the UK and Spain do we obtain signi¯cantly positive coe±cients.
While we also ¯nd positive (and mostly signi¯cant) e®ects for commercial, cooperative and
real estate banks, the dummy for other banks - including investment banks - now displays
a signi¯cantly negative coe±cient.
Among the macroeconomic regressors, only the long-term interest rate and the index
yield deliver signi¯cant e®ects with the expected signs, but no longer the credit risk spread.
5.3 Robustness analyses
Several auxiliary analyses have been conducted in order to improve the robustness of our
results. With regard to regressors we tested di®erent variables, in line with our informal
arguments of section 4, for inclusion into the model. To mitigate the problem of multi-
collinearity, we excluded highly-correlated regressors. We therefore estimated correlation
coe±cients for each possible combination of two regressors. These coe±cients are given in
tables 15 and 16 in the appendix. Overall, ¯ve combinations of highly correlated coe±cients
were observed and led to the exclusion of variables loans, short interest, credit risk spread,
performance AAA and performance BBB in the multivariate analyses.
Furthermore, we considered di®erent model speci¯cations in order to take account of
the data reduction following from individual variable arrangements. This is particularly
obvious for models accounting for equity characteristics that were not available for all
banks. We therefore constructed one individual model (model I for the full sample, model
IV for the sample on stock-listed banks) that entails variable tier 1 capital, which reduced
the number of observations to 952 in the full sample and to 365 in the test on stock-listed
banks. In models II, III, V and VI we disregarded this variable in order to increase the
number of eligible observations.
Finally, we also took into account di®erent measures of performance, risk and liquidity,
with only the most signi¯cant variables being included in our main analyses. We also
checked the in°uence of additional dummy variables based on extreme regressor values,
e.g. a dummy for the 10% of banks with lowest risk or highest performance. Results from
a multivariate regression with these additional regressors can be obtained from table 17 in
the appendix.
20Table 10: Multivariate results - the likelihood of CLO-transactions for listed banks
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of issuing assets via an ABS-transaction. The
dependent variable equals one if a bank accomplishes an ABS-transaction and zero otherwise.
Coef. is the coe±cient estimates. p-values are estimated with the corresponding z-statistic.
Log likelihood is the maximized value of the log likelihood function l(^ ¯). McFadden R-squared
is an analog to the R
2 reported in linear regression models. *, **, ***: signi¯cance at the
10%-, 5%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
IV IVa IVb IVc V Va Vb VI
regressor Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
C -6.297*** -5.829*** -5.469*** -6.994*** -7.495*** -6.774*** -6.937*** -5.149***
Risk 0.014** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.011* 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.007
Quality -0.095 0.002 -0.043 -0.052 -0.038 -0.082 -0.082 0.006
Tier 1 -0.041 -0.201** -0.206** -0.319***
Equity Share 0.100 0.088 0.095 0.152 0.057 0.029 0.030 0.039
RoE 0.003 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 0.018 0.003 0.007 0.014
CIR -0.012 -0.027** -0.024** -0.025* 0.011 -0.009 -0.001 0.010
Liquidity -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002** -0.003** -0.004***
LN (Total Assets) 0.393*** 0.433*** 0.406*** 0.584*** 0.322*** 0.352*** 0.315*** 0.356***
TAX -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.014 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.002
Business -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004
Year 1998 0.593 0.030 0.214 -0.013 0.542 0.387 0.450
Year 1999 1.095** 0.899* 0.893* 0.901* 1.001*** 0.883** 0.919**
Year 2000 1.284*** 1.400*** 1.395*** 1.457*** 1.267*** 1.337*** 1.345***
Year 2001 1.253*** 1.040** 1.091** 1.127** 1.202*** 1.105*** 1.203***
Year 2002 1.147*** 0.912* 1.025** 1.047** 1.139*** 1.050*** 1.208***
Year 2003 1.281*** 1.020** 1.067** 1.218** 1.189*** 1.008*** 1.137***
Germany 0.731** -0.654 -0.359 -1.021** 0.867*** 0.304 0.453 0.506
France 0.130 -0.450 -0.398 -0.611 -0.158 -0.519 -0.465 -0.362
UK 0.701* 0.884** 0.869** 1.574*** 0.902*** 0.852*** 0.925*** 1.197***
Spain 0.609* 0.449 0.453 0.673* 0.715** 0.597** 0.605** 0.507*
Italy -0.283 -1.212*** -0.951** -1.340*** -0.138 -0.413 -0.397 -0.152
Commercial 1.015* 0.952 0.878 0.784 1.268*** 1.354** 1.392*** 1.307**
Cooperative 1.459** 2.103** 1.608** 2.042** 1.037* 1.194* 1.193* 1.034*
Real 1.292* 1.128 1.088 0.576 0.983* 1.165** 1.170* 0.867
Other bank -1.512** -2.233*** -2.216*** -3.911 -1.112** -1.316** -1.229** -1.073*
Volatility 0.010 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002
MBR 0.127* 0.142* 0.144* 0.172** 0.052 0.094 0.093 0.044
Beta 0.131 0.595 0.392 0.486 0.164 0.246 0.227 -0.167
GDP rate -0.036
Index 0.003**
Long interest -0.446**
Credit risk spread 0.192
low tier 1 -9.551* -3.948 -8.127
low tier 1*tier 1 2.144** 0.898 1.880*
high risk 5.982*** 4.499*** 6.365** 3.028*** 2.440***
high risk*risk -0.127*** -0.100*** -0.148*** -0.066*** -0.055***
low performance 0.662 -2.077 0.907 -0.122 -3.732
low performance*cir 0.006 0.033 0.003 0.015 0.051
low liquidity 1.945** 2.011** -1.303 0.829 0.770
low liquidity*liquidity -0.055 -0.0558* 0.042 -0.016 -0.013
high risk*low equity 6.277***
Log likelihood -157.58 -133.79 -142.44 -125.07 -194.75 -180.80 -184.56 -189.09
Obs with Dep=0 253 253 253 253 367 367 367 329
Obs with Dep=1 112 112 112 112 131 131 131 131
Total obs 365 365 365 365 498 498 498 460
McFadden R2 0.30 0.41 0.37 0.44 0.32 0.37 0.36 0.31
216 Discussion of Results
Our results point to a re¯nement of the e±cient contracting hypothesis regarding the use of
loan securitization. Generally, we ¯nd that a bank is more likely to issue CLOs the larger
the bank (more assets), the higher the bank's credit risk exposure, the lower its liquidity and
the lower its performance (measured by the cost-income ratio). Interestingly, equity capital,
or even more precise tier 1 capital, does not seem to in°uence banks' securitization decisions
very strongly. We also ¯nd that banks in di®erent countries display di®erent propensities
to engage in securitization activities, while we can hardly discriminate between banks'
business types. With regard to macroeconomic factors, both GDP-growth and interest
rates (and credit risk spread) seem to a®ect a bank's securitization decision positively.
Looking into even more details, we ¯nd that the risk impact also holds for the 10%
of banks with highest risk. Yet, among these banks the risk variable reduces a bank's
inclination to issue CLOs. With regard to performance and liquidity, however, we do not
¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect in the respective extreme deciles.
With regard to the full sample, we may therefore conclude that banks obviously use
loan securitization to transfer risk to the market and improve their liquidity situation.
Yet, since risk and liquidity do not seem to impact banks' behavior in the extreme deciles
(of banks with highest credit risk and lowest liquidity) our results may also point into
one further direction: particularly commercial banks may make use of loan securitization
in order to indirectly tap the markets for investment bank activities (and the associated
gains) without directly crossing the traditional border to investment bank businesses. The
additional ¯nding that lowly-performing banks show a high inclination towards securitiza-
tion activities may be taken as a sign against the \appetite-for-risk" notion. Obviously,
issuance of securitized loans does not necessarily improve performance, so that this instru-
ment should mainly have been used to reduce credit risk and aim for the yield on CLO
issuances.
For stock-listed banks, size and credit risk remain important driving factors for the
securitization decision. Yet, liquidity reasons seem to play a lesser role, the same holds
for performance arguments, while an equity-capital shortage seems to become a more
important factor. In particular, loan securitization can be shown to grow more likely the
lower tier 1 capital. Yet, this e®ect is reversed for ¯rms with lowest tier 1 capital. It
can only be found for those ¯rms with highest risk and lowest equity capital, who are
again very likely to engage in loan securitization. Again, these ¯ndings may be indicative
of securitization transactions mainly being used as a risk-transfer and funding tool that
allows a more e±cient risk-sharing and liquidity transformation.
Still, as the reversal of the risk regressor's e®ect in the extreme decile shows (both for
the total sample and for stock-listed banks only), the use of loan securitization as a risk-
transfer tool is limited. This result coincides with observations from CRT markets which
conclude that banks tend to retain the highest-risk tranches and therefore risk-transfer is
(still) small relative to notional size.
227 Conclusion
Based on recent research on the markets for credit risk transfer, this study examined ¯rm-
speci¯c and macroeconomic factors that drive ¯nancial institutions' decision to engage in
loan securitization transactions. While we cannot reject the hypothesis that banks use loan
securitization to save on regulatory capital, we ¯nd that the main factors driving banks'
securitization decisions are the size of total assets, credit risk, liquidity and performance.
As such, we conclude that banks active in loan securitization are large, lowly-performing
institutions with high credit risk and low liquidity. Obviously, securitization transactions
are therefore used to reduce the bank's exposure to default risk and to increase its liquidity
situation. Still, the instrument's risk-transfer and funding capacity seems to be limited:
¯rms in the lowest decile of liquidity do not show a signi¯cant inclination towards loan
securitization; for ¯rms in the highest credit risk decile, the variable's e®ect even gets
reversed.
As a conclusion we may state that the market for credit risk does not seem to be ham-
pered by the new regulatory framework of Basel II that will no longer allow for regulatory
capital arbitrage. Rather, it seems that banks try to feed their appetite for risk-transfer
and liquidity via CLO issuances and possibly also try to tap the market for investment
bank activities.
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25Appendix
Table 11: De¯nition of macroeconomic and dummy variables
Regressor De¯nition
Macroeconomic variables
CDP credit default probability
DUR rating downgrade-upgrade-ratio
GDP Rate GDP-growth rate
Index Country speci¯c yield of a well diversi¯ed stock index
(Germany = CDAX, France = CAC40, UK = FTSE 350)
Short interest Libor 3 month
Long interest Long-term interest rate of country speci¯c government bonds
Credit risk spread Di®erence between yield of AAA- and BBB-rated risk indices
Performance AAA Yield of AAA-rated credit risk index (MSCI Overall)
Performance BBB Yield of BBB-rated credit risk index (MSCI Overall)
Dummy variables
LIST 1 if bank is listed, 0 otherwise
Year 1997 1 in 1997, 0 otherwise
Year 1998 1 in 1998, 0 otherwise
Year 1999 1 in 1999, 0 otherwise
Year 2000 1 in 2000, 0 otherwise
Year 2001 1 in 2001, 0 otherwise
Year 2002 1 in 2002, 0 otherwise
Year 2003 1 in 2003, 0 otherwise
Germany 1 if bank registered in Germany, 0 otherwise
France 1 if bank registered in France, 0 otherwise
UK 1 if bank registered in UK, 0 otherwise
Spain 1 if bank registered in Spain, 0 otherwise
Italy 1 if bank registered in Italy, 0 otherwise
Other country 1 if bank not registered in countries above, 0 otherwise
Commercial 1 if commercial bank, 0 otherwise
Cooperative 1 if cooperative bank, 0 otherwise
Real 1 if real estate bank, 0 otherwise
Investment 1 if investment bank, 0 otherwise
Savings 1 if savings bank, 0 otherwise
Other type 1 if bank not registered in classi¯cation above, 0 otherwise
For quoted banks only
Volatility stock return volatility
MBR market-to-book ratio
Beta beta coe±cient calculated via market model
26Table 12: Descriptive statistics - ¯rm-speci¯c and macroeconomic variables
Descriptive statistics for banks in our sample in the time period 1997 to 2004. Calculations
are based on the full sample of 1948 banks.
regressor N mean std. dev. median range
Firm speci¯c
Risk (in %) 1640 18.19 334.66 130.40 [-238.76; 724.94]
Quality (in %) 1685 10.89 79.19 91.17 [0.00; 97.08]
Tier 1 (in %) 1045 9.15 7.50 7.80 [1.80; 87.00]
Equity share (in %) 1722 5.07 6.54 4.35 [0.27; 86.59]
RoE (in %) 1716 10.50 11.00 10.44 [-110.04; 115.51]
CIR (in %) 1698 59.84 21.46 61.84 [0.71; 441.33]
Liquidity (in %) 1621 110.74 119.94 77.56 [0.00; 995.80]
Total assets (in mil.) 1722 113468 148170 50735 [172; 994965]
Loans (in mil.) 1720 53999 65783 26859 [0.00; 419414]
Tax (in %) 1652 29.64 16.40 29.28 [0.00; 99.84]
Business (in %) 1686 39.06 57.66 31.19 [0.00; 868.86]
Macroeconomic
CDP (in %) 1722 2.14 1.00 2.16 [0.66; 3.82]
DUR 1722 2.12 1.00 2.06 [0.85; 4.16]
GDP Rate (in %) 1722 2.46 1.68 2.00 [-1.10; 11.70]
Index (Basis 1995) 1621 219.50 69.88 206.50 [114.10; 778.70]
Short interest (in %) 1722 3.96 1.43 3.56 [0.33; 13.97]
Long interest (in %) 1675 5.00 0.76 4.91 [2.63; 9.92]
Credit risk spread 1722 1.36 0.57 1.50 [0.27;2.26]
Performance AAA 1722 0.08 0.12 0.10 [-0.15;0.22]
Performance BBB 1722 0.09 0.12 0.16 [-0.07;0.20]
For quoted banks only
Volatility 542 0.12 0.09 0.11 [0.01; 1.25]
MBR 521 2.35 1.69 2.13 [-14.48; 9.99]
Beta 564 0.59 0.46 0.53 [-1.26;3.64]
27Table 13: Descriptive statistics - sub-groups
General and descriptive statistics with regard to ¯rm-speci¯c variables for three subgroups
of banks: banks in the decile of highest credit risk (highest risk)of lowest cost-income ratio
(highest performance) and of lowest equity (lowest tier 1 capital).
Banks with highest risk
General statistics Number of securitizations = 46
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N 14 22 16 26 19 37 31
Country Germany France UK Spain Italy Other country
N 89 30 3 26 3 14
Bank Commercial Cooperative Real Investment Savings Other type
N 68 16 17 4 2 58
Firm speci¯c regressors
Mean Std. dev. Median Range
Risk 74.46 78.65 51.41 [37.20;724.94]
Quality 11.98 8.83 10.3 [0.00;83.42]
Tier 1 7.81 4.95 6.4 [4.30;44.92]
Equity Share 4.25 6.84 0.46 [0.46;86.59]
RoE 1.41 16.95 5.54 [-110.04;32.63]
CIR 57.78 24.3 60.95 [14.59;172.42]
Liquidity 85.36 94.43 65.67 0.40;692.47]
Total assets 120,364 124,619 69,970 [12,452;526,452]
Tax 20.43 18.87 18.54 [0;70.20]
Business 51.49 101.01 23.85 [0;868.86]
Banks with best performance
General statistics Number of securitizations = 9
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N 31 28 21 26 21 19 19
Country Germany France UK Spain Italy Other country
N 69 14 4 17 6 55
Bank Commercial Cooperative Real Investment Savings Other type
N 50 69 0 1 0 45
Firm speci¯c regressors
Mean Std. dev. Median Range
Risk 24.32 35.12 17.67 [-41.36;239.53]
Quality 10.53 7.43 8.18 [0;46.49]
Tier 1 18.56 19.03 11.10 [5.10;84.30]
Equity Share 5.11 11.10 2.99 [0.46;86.59]
RoE 9.90 11.41 10.24 [-110.04;33.25]
CIR 21.80 8.37 24.21 [0.71;32.48]
Liquidity 159.01 200.05 79.97 [0;973.66]
Total assets 52,730 52,641 35,858 [593.7;301,777]
Tax 30.30 16.40 31.71 [0;70.81]
Business 5.14 10.48 0.36 [0.00; 56.58]
Banks with low equity
General statistics Number of securitizations = 25
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N 24 21 15 17 12 9 6
Country Germany France UK Spain Italy Other country
N 53 15 0 28 2 6
Bank Commercial Cooperative Real Investment Savings Other type
N 49 8 12 3 1 31
Firm speci¯c regressors
Mean Std. dev. Median Range
Risk 39.72 80.46 25.02 [-12.36;724.94]
Quality 10.50 3.83 9.87 [0.46;21.69]
Tier 1 5.02 0.67 5.15 [1.80;5.70]
Equity Share 3.52 1.95 2.98 [0.30;9.15]
RoE 7.24 17.34 7.54 [-71.24;115.51]
CIR 63.98 14.92 66.28 [22.45;109.95]
Liquidity 89.00 74.02 73.82 [12.52;595.61]
Total assets 117,610 125,281 76,944 [10,325;695,344]
Tax 33.92 18.50 38.69 [0.00;75.25]
Business 40.71 45.81 32.42 [0.00;282.40]
28Table 14: Country-speci¯c separation of macroeconomic variables index and long interest
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Index
Germany 173.8 234.7 249.8 332.9 262.5 195.5 149.4
France 147.3 197.6 242.9 334.8 268 202.6 166.5
UK 139.9 168.1 187.5 190.1 165.9 137.3 120.8
Italy 139.6 219.7 241.4 316.4 249.5 190.8 170.6
Spain 194 284.2 309.8 336.5 271 217.8 206.5
Long Interest
Germany 5.64 4.57 4.49 5.26 4.8 4.78 4.07
France 5.58 4.64 4.61 5.39 4.94 4.86 4.13
UK 7.13 5.6 5.01 5.33 5.01 4.91 4.58
Italy 6.86 4.88 4.73 5.58 5.19 5.03 4.25
Spain 6.4 4.83 4.73 5.53 5.12 4.96 4.12
Table 15: Correlation matrix of regressors - I
Risk 1 Quality Tier 1 Equity RoE CIR Liquid. Total Loans Tax Busi.
share asset
Risk 1.00 0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.33 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.14 0.21
Quality 0.01 1.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.10 -0.20 0.01 0.11
Tier 1 -0.15 -0.02 1.00 0.36 0.02 -0.38 0.02 -0.22 -0.21 -0.09 -0.14
Equity share -0.05 -0.11 0.36 1.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.24 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04
RoE -0.33 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00 -0.26 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.05
CIR 0.03 0.06 -0.38 -0.09 -0.26 1.00 -0.08 0.19 0.09 -0.06 0.26
Liquidity -0.03 0.13 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 1.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.10 -0.05
Total asset 0.08 0.10 -0.22 -0.24 -0.04 0.19 -0.05 1.00 0.87 -0.10 0.14
Loans 0.06 -0.20 -0.21 -0.14 0.00 0.09 -0.12 0.87 1.00 -0.07 0.03
Tax -0.14 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 -0.10 -0.07 1.00 -0.06
Business 0.21 0.11 -0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.26 -0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.06 1.00
CPD 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.13 0.13 -0.12 0.02
DUR 0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.09 0.02
GDP Rate -0.13 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.26 -0.07 -0.06 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 0.04
Index -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.01
Short interest -0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.04 -0.02
Long interst -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.15 -0.04 0.00 -0.13 -0.10 0.09 -0.06
Volatility 0.13 0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.17 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.12 -0.06
MBR -0.17 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.30 -0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.10
29Table 16: Correlation matrix of regressors - II
CPD DUR GDP Index Short Long Vola MBR Cr Perf. Perf.
Rate inter. inter. spread AAA BBB
Risk 0.00 0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.13 -0.17 0.04 -0.06 -0.08
Quality -0.07 -0.10 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.18 -0.12 0.13 0.10
Tier 1 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Equity share -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.01
RoE -0.06 -0.10 0.26 0.07 0.18 0.15 -0.17 0.30 -0.09 0.08 0.09
CIR 0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
Liquid. -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01
Total asset 0.13 0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.09 -0.13 0.09 0.07 0.16 -0.12 -0.10
Loans 0.13 0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 0.06 0.05 0.16 -0.12 -0.10
Tax -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 0.00 0.04 0.09 -0.12 -0.01 -0.14 0.08 0.08
Business 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.00
CPD 1.00 0.46 -0.18 0.32 -0.04 -0.25 -0.05 -0.04 0.76 -0.04 0.01
DUR 0.46 1.00 -0.39 -0.14 -0.32 -0.45 0.10 -0.16 0.87 -0.60 -0.66
GDP Rate -0.18 -0.39 1.00 0.35 0.31 0.34 -0.09 0.28 -0.35 0.46 0.43
Index 0.32 -0.14 0.35 1.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.20 0.09 0.34 0.36
Short interest -0.04 -0.32 0.31 0.05 1.00 0.80 0.09 0.26 -0.31 0.46 0.30
Long interest -0.25 -0.45 0.34 -0.01 0.80 1.00 0.07 0.19 -0.55 0.64 0.44
Volatility -0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.09 0.07 1.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.15
MBR -0.04 -0.16 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.19 -0.04 1.00 -0.14 0.19 0.20
Credit risk spread 0.76 0.87 -0.35 0.09 -0.31 -0.55 0.02 -0.14 1.00 -0.58 -0.53
Performance AAA -0.04 -0.60 0.46 0.34 0.46 0.64 -0.07 0.19 -0.58 1.00 0.86
Performance BBB 0.01 -0.66 0.43 0.36 0.30 0.44 -0.15 0.20 -0.53 0.86 1.00
30Table 17: Multivariate results - the likelihood of CLO-transactions for all banks (model
VII and VIII) and listed banks (model IX)
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of issuing assets via an ABS-transaction. The
dependent variable equals one if a bank accomplishes an ABS-transaction and zero otherwise.
Coef. is the coe±cient estimates. p-values are estimated with the corresponding z-statistic.
Log likelihood is the maximized value of the log likelihood function l(^ ¯). McFadden R-squared
is an analog to the R
2 reported in linear regression models. Bold ¯gures refer to signi¯cant
coe±cients, as can be seen from the given p-values.
Model I Model II Model III
Regressor Coef. Coef. Coef.
C -8.023*** -7.199*** -6.530***
RISK 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.040**
QUALITY 0.113** 0.044 -0.275**
Tier 1 0.036 -0.071
Equity share 0.000 0.007 0.164*
RoE 0.005 -0.001 -0.006
CIR 0.006 0.002 -0.003
Liquidity -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002
LN (Total Assets) 0.327*** 0.300*** 0.454***
TAX 0.002 -0.003 0.002
Business 0.000 0.000 -0.002
Year 1998 0.754*** 0.859*** 0.136
Year 1999 1.275*** 1.452*** 0.630
Year 2000 1.274*** 1.353*** 1.197**
Year 2001 1.443*** 1.552*** 0.918*
Year 2002 1.454*** 1.509*** 0.833*
Year 2003 1.502*** 1.547*** 0.882*
Germany 0.203 0.020 -0.186
France -0.309* -0.586*** -0.421
UK 0.217 0.355 0.832*
Spain 0.026 -0.249 0.384
Italy 1.047*** 0.934*** -1.011**
Commercial 1.318*** 1.415*** 0.800
Cooperative 1.502*** 1.873*** 1.230*
Real 0.547** 1.106*** 1.037
Investment 0.536 0.459
Savings 0.834*** 1.034***
Other bank -2.375***
Volatility -0.008
MBR 0.147*
Beta 0.287
low equity -1.794
low equity*tier 1 0.418
high risk 0.735** 1.295*** 4.175***
low risk -0.070 -0.504
high risk*risk -0.019*** -0.037*** -0.086**
low quality 0.312 -4.110**
high quality -0.316 0.089
low quality*quality 0.008 0.380**
high performance -4.553** -18.224* 1.343
low performance 0.025 1.160**
high performance*CIR 0.149** 0.605* -0.009
low liquidity -0.267 0.918* 1.798*
high liquidity 0.341 0.415
low liquidity*liquidity 0.024 -0.035 -0.051
high risk*low equity 0.217
Log likelihood -513.52 -357.16 -137.42
Obs with Dep=0 1257 740 253
Obs with Dep=1 268 213 112
McFadden R2 0.276 0.295 0.389
Total obs 1525 953 365
31